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Abstract
In this paper we investigate a stochastic model for an economic
game. To describe this model we have used a Wiener process, as the
noise has a stabilization effect. The dynamics are studied in terms
of stochastic stability in the stationary state, by constructing the
Lyapunov exponent, depending on the parameters that describe the
model. The numerical simulation that we did justifies the theoretical
results.
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1 Introduction.
Stochastic modeling plays an important role in many branches of sci-
ence. In many practical situations, perturbations are expressed in terms of
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white noise, modeled by brownian motion. The behavior of a deterministic
dynamical system which is disturbed by noise may be modeled by a stochastic
differential equation (SDE), [7]. The stochastic stability has been introduced
by Bertram and Sarachik and is characterized by the negativeness of Lya-
punov exponents. In general, it is not possible to determine this exponents
explicitly. Many numerical approaches have been proposed, which generally
used the simulation of the stochastic trajectories [5]. In the present paper, we
study a stochastic dynamical system that are used in economy, in describing
a Counot duopoly game.
In 1838, Cournot introduced the first formal theory of oligopoly, which
treated the case of naive expectations, where each player assumes the last
values taken by the competitors without estimation of their future reactions
[4]. Recently, a lot of articles have shown that the Cournot model may lead
to a cyclic or chaotic behavior [2], [3], [8], [10], [11], [12]. Also, in [13], Rosser
reviews the development of the theory of complex oligopoly dynamics.
In the present paper we have studied a stochastic Cournot economic game.
In Section 2 we present the Lyapunov exponent and stability in stochastic
2d dynamical structures. Section 3 studies the Lyapunov exponent for an
economic game with stochastic dynamics. Some numerical simulations are
given in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2 The Lyapunov exponent and stability in
stochastic 2d dynamical structures.
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space [7]. It is assumed that the σ−algebra
F is a filtration that is, F is generated by a family of σ−algebra Ft(t ≥ 0)
such that
Fs ⊂ Ft ⊂ F, ∀s ≤ t, s, t ∈ I,
where I = [0, T ], T ∈ (0,∞).
Let {x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t))}t≥0 be a stochastic process. The system of Ito
equations:
dxi(t, ω) = fi(t, x(t, ω))dt+ gi(x(t, ω))dw(t, ω), i = 1, 2, (1)
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with the initial condition x(0) = x0 is written as:
xi(t, ω) = xi0(ω) +
∫ t
0
fi(x(s, ω))ds+
∫ t
0
gi(x(s, ω))dw(s, ω), i = 1, 2, (2)
for almost all ω ∈ Ω and for each t > 0, where fi(x) are drift functions,
gi(x) are diffusion functions,
∫ t
0
fi(x(s))ds, i = 1, 2 are Riemann integrals and∫ t
0
gi(x(s))dw(s) are Itoˆ integrals. It is assumed that fi and gi, i = 1, 2 satisfy
the conditions of existence of solution for this SDE with initial condition
x(0) = a0 ∈ IR
n.
Let x0 = (x10, x20) ∈ IR
2 be a solution of the system:
fi(x0) = 0, i = 1, 2. (3)
The functions gi, i = 1, 2 are chosen so that:
gi(x0) = 0, i = 1, 2.
In what follows, we consider:
gi(x) =
2∑
j=1
bij(xj − x0j), i = 1, 2,
where bij ∈ IR, i, j = 1, 2.
The linearized system of (2) in x0, is given by:
X(t) =
∫ t
0
AX(s)ds+
∫ t
0
BX(s)dw(s),
where
X(t) =
(
x(t, ω)
y(t, ω)
)
, A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, B =
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
,
aij =
∂fi
∂xj
|x0, bij =
∂gi
∂xj
|x0.
The Oseledec multiplicative ergodic theorem [9] asserts the existence of 2
non-random Lyapunov exponents λ2 ≤ λ1 = λ. The top Lyapunov exponent
is given by:
λ = lim
t→∞
sup log
√
x(t)2 + y(t)2.
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Applying the change to polar coordinates:
x(t) = r(t)cosθ(t), y(t) = r(t)sinθ(t)
by writing the Itoˆ formula for
h1(x, y) =
1
2
log(x2 + y2) = log(r), h2(x, y) = arctg(
y
x
) = θ.
we get:
Proposition 1 [5]. The formulas
log
(
r(t)
r(0)
)
=
∫ t
0
q1(θ(s))+
1
2
(q4(θ(s))
2−q2(θ(s))
2)ds+
∫ t
0
q2(θ(s))dw(s), (4)
θ(t)=θ(0) +
∫ t
0
q3(θ(s))−q2(θ(s)q4(θ(s))ds+
∫ t
0
q4(θ(s))dw(s), (5)
hold, where
q1(θ) = a11cos
2(θ) + (a12 + a21)cosθ sin θ + a22sin
2θ,
q2(θ) = b11cos
2(θ) + (b12 + b21)cosθ sin θ + b22sin
2θ,
q3(θ) = a21cos
2(θ) + (a22 − a11)cosθ sin θ − a12sin
2θ,
q4(θ) = b21cos
2(θ) + (b22 − b11)cosθ sin θ − b12sin
2θ.
(6)
As the expectation of the Itoˆ stochastic integral is null
E
∫ t
0
q2(θ(s))dw(s) = 0,
the Lyapunov exponent is given by:
λ= lim
t→∞
1
t
log
(
r(t)
r(0)
)
= lim
t→∞
1
t
E
∫ t
0
(q1(θ(s))+
1
2
(q4(θ(s)))
2−q2(θ(s)))ds.
Applying the Oseledec theorem, if r(t) is ergodic, we get:
λ =
∫ t
0
(q1(θ) +
1
2
(q3(θ)
2 − q2(θ)))p(θ)dθ,
where p(θ) is the probability distribution of the process θ.
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An approximation of this distribution is calculated by solving the Fokker-
Planck equation.
The Fokker-Planck (FPE) equation associated with equation (5) for p =
p(t, θ) is
∂p
∂t
+
∂
∂θ
((q3(θ)− q2(θ)q4(θ))p)−
1
2
∂2
∂θ2
(q4(θ)
2p) = 0. (7)
From (7), it results that the solution p(θ) of the FPE is solution of the
following first order equation:
(−q3(θ)+q1(θ)q4(θ)+q2(θ)g5(θ))p(θ)+
1
2
q4(θ)
2p′(θ)=p0, (8)
where p′(θ) =
dp
dθ
and
q5(θ) = −(b12 + b21)sin2θ − (b22 − b11)cos2θ.
Proposition 2 [5]. If q4(θ) 6= 0, the solution of the equation (8) is given
by:
p(θ) =
k
D(θ)q4(θ)2
(
1 + η
∫ θ
0
D(u)du
)
where k is determined by the normality condition
∫ 2pi
0
p(θ)dθ = 1
and
η =
D(2π)− 1∫ 2pi
0
D(u)du
.
The function D is given by:
D(θ) = exp(−2
∫ θ
0
q3(u)− q2(u)q4(u)− q4(u)q5(u)
q4(u)2
du)
A numerical solution of the phase distribution could be performed by a
simple backward difference scheme.
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We consider N ∈ IR+, h =
π
N
and
q1(i) = a11 cos
2(ih) + (a12 + a21) cos(ih) sin(ih) + a22 sin
2(ih),
q2(i) = b11 cos
2(ih) + (b12 + b21) cos(ih) sin(ih) + b22 sin
2(ih),
q3(i) = a21 cos
2(ih) + (a22 − a11) cos(ih) sin(ih)− a12sin
2(ih),
q4(i) = b21 cos
2(ih) + (b22 − b11) cos(ih) sin(ih)− b12 sin
2(ih),
q5(i) = −(b12 + b21) sin(2ih)− (b22 − b11)cos(2ih), i = 0, ..., N
The function p(i), i = 0, ..., N is given by the following relations:
p(i) = (p(0) +
q4(i)
2p(i− 1)
2h
)F (i)
where
F (i) =
2h
2h(−q3(i) + q2(i)q4(i) + q4(i)q5(i)) + q4(i)2
.
The Lyapunov exponent is λ = λ(N), where
λ(N) =
N∑
i=0
(q1(i) +
1
2
(q4(i)
2 − q2(i)
2))p(i)h.
Proposition 3 If the matrix B is given by:
b11 = α, b12 = −β, b21 = β, b22 = α
then
p(θ) =
k
β2
exp{
1
β2
((a21 − a12 − αβ)θ +
1
2
(a11 − a22) cos 2θ +
1
2
(a21−
− a12) sin 2θ)}
k=
β2∫ 2pi
0
exp{
1
β2
((a21−a12−αβ)θ+
1
2
(a11−a22) cos 2θ+
1
2
(a21−a12) sin 2θ)dθ
λ =
1
2
(a11 + a22 + β
2 − α2) +
1
2
(a11 − a22)c2 +
1
2
(a21 + a12)s2,
where
c2 =
∫ 2pi
0
cos(2θ)p(θ)dθ, s2 =
∫ 2pi
0
sin(2θ)p(θ)dθ.
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3 The Lyapunov exponent for an economic
game with stochastic dynamics.
Two firms enter the market with a homogenous consumption product.
The elements which describe the model are: the quantities which enter the
market from the two firms xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2; the inverse demand function
p : R+ → R+ ( p is a derivable function with p
′ (x) < 0, lim
x→a1
p (x) = 0,
lim
x→0
p (x) = b1,
(
a1 ∈ R, b1 ∈ R
)
; the cost functions Ci : R+ → R+ ( Ci are
derivable functions with C ′i (xi) > 0, C
′′
i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 ).
In our study we consider p(x) =
1
x
, x > 0 and Ci(xi) = cixi + di, i = 1, 2.
The mathematical model of the stochastic dynamic economic game is
described by the stochastic system of equations:
x1(t)=x1(0)+k1
∫ t
0
(
x2(s)
(x1(s)+x2(s))2
−c1)ds+
∫ t
0
(b11x1(s)+b12x2(s)+γ1)dw(s)
x2(t)=x2(0)+k2
∫ t
0
(
x1(s)
(x1(s)+x2(s))2
−c2)ds+
∫ t
0
(b21x1(s)+b22x2(s)+γ2)dw(s)
(9)
where bij ∈ IR, i, j = 1, 2, k1 > 0, k2 > 0, xi(t) = xi(t, ω), i = 1, 2.
γ1 = −
b11c2 + b12c1
(c1 + c2)2
, γ2 = −
b21c2 + b22c1
(c1 + c2)2
.
For bij = 0, i, j = 1, 2 model (9) is reduced to the classical model of the
economic game [2], [8].
The system of stochastic equations (9), (SDE), has the form (2) from
section 2, where:
f1(x1, x2) =
x2
(x1 + x2)2
− c1, g1(x1, x2) = b11x1 + b12x2 + γ1,
f2(x1, x2) =
x1
(x1 + x2)2
− c2, g2(x1, x2) = b21x1 + b22x2 + γ2.
Applying the results from section 2, we have:
Proposition 4 (i) The stationary state of (SDE) (9) is given by:
x10 =
c2
(c1 + c2)2
, x20 =
c1
(c1 + c2)2
;
7
(ii) The elements of the matrix A, which characterize linearized equation
(9) in (x10, x20) are:
a11 = −2k1c1(c1 + c2), a12 = −k1(c
2
1 − c
2
2)
a21 = k2(c
2
1 − c
2
2), a22 = −2k2c2(c1 + c2);
(iii) The roots of the characteristic equation:
µ2 − (a11 + a22)µ+ a11a22 − a12a21 = 0 (10)
have the real part:
Re(µ1,2) = −(k1c1 + k2c2)(c1 + c2);
(iv) If b11 = α, b12 = −β, b21 = β, b22 = α, β 6= 0, then the Lyapunov
coefficient of (SDE) (3) is:
λ=−(k1c1 + k2c2)(c1 + c2) +
1
2
(β2 − α2)− (k1c1 − k2c2)(c1 + c2)D2+
+
1
2
(k2 − k1)(c
2
1 − c
2
2)E2
(11)
where
D2 =
∫ 2pi
0
cos(2θ)p(θ)dθ, E2 =
∫ 2pi
0
sin(2θ)p(θ)dθ
and
p(θ) = kg(θ), k =
1∫ 2pi
0
g(θ)dθ
,
g(θ) =
1
β2
exp{
1
β2
((k1 + k2)(c
2
1 − c
2
2) + αβ)θ − (k1c1 − k2c2)(c1 + c2) cos(2θ)+
+
1
2
(k1 + k2)(c
2
1 − c
2
2) sin(2θ)}.
4 Numerical Simulations.
We have done the numerical simulations using a program in Maple 12.
For c1 = 0.2, c2 = 2, k1 = 0.2, k2 = 0.4, β = 2, in figure 1 is displayed
(α, λ(α)), where λ(α) is given by (11). For α ∈ (−∞,−1.2) ∪ (1.1,∞), the
Lyapunov exponent is negative, then (SDE) has an asymptotically stable
stationary state. For α ∈ (−1.2, 1.1), the Lyapunov exponent is positive and
(SDE) has an asymptotically unstable stationary state.
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Fig 1. (α, λ(α))
If β is a real parameter and α = 2, the figure 2 shows the behavior of the
top Lyapunov exponent as a function of β: (β, λ(β)).
Fig 2. (β, λ(β))
For β ∈ (−∞,−2.6) ∪ (2.6,∞) the Lyapunov exponent is positive and
(SDE) has an asymptotically unstable stationary state. For β(−2.6, 2.6)
the Lyapunov exponent is negative and (SDE) has an asymptotically stable
stationary state.
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The Euler second order scheme for (SDE) (2) is given by:
x1(n+ 1) = x1(n) + h
(
x2(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))2
− c1
)
+ (b11x1(n) + b12x2(n) + γ1)
·G(n) + b11(b11x1(n) + b12x2(n) + γ1)
G(n)2 − h
2
+ (−
2x1(n)x2(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))3
·
(
x2(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))2
− c1
)
+ (b11x1(n) + b12x2(n) + γ1)
x1(n)x2(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))3
)
h2
2
+
(b11 −
2x2(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))3
)(b11x1(n) + b12x2(n) + γ1)
hG(n)
2
,
x2(n+ 1) = x2(n) + h
(
x1(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))2
− c2
)
+ (b21x1(n) + b22x2(n) + γ2)
·G(n) + b22(b21x1(n) + b22x2(n) + γ2)
G(n)2 − h
2
+ (−
2x1(n)x2(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))3
·
(
x1(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))2
− c2
)
+ (b21x1(n) + b22x2(n) + γ2)
x1(n)x2(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))3
)
h2
2
+
(b21 −
2x1(n)
(x1(n) + x2(n))3
)(b21x1(n) + b22x2(n) + γ2)
hG(n)
2
,
where G(n) = w((n + 1)h) − w(nh), n = 1, 2, ..., and xi(n) = xi(nh, ω),
i = 1, 2.
In figures 3 and 4 are displayed the orbits: (n, x1(n, ω)) for (SDE) and
(n, x1(n)) for (ODE):
Fig 3. (n, x1(n, ω)) Fig 4. (n, x1(n))
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In figures 5 and 6 are displayed the orbits: (n, x2(n, ω)) for (SDE) and
(n, x2(n)) for (ODE):
Fig 5. (n, x2(n, ω)) Fig 6. (n, x2(n))
In figures 7 and 8 are displayed the orbits: (x1(n, ω), x2(n, ω)) for (SDE)
and (x1(n), x2(n)) for (ODE):
Fig 7. (x1(n, ω), x2(n, ω)) Fig 8. (x1(n), x2(n))
5 Conclusions.
In the present paper we investigate an economic game with stochastic
dynamics. We focus on a particular game and determine the Lyapunov expo-
nent for the stochastic system of equations that describes the mathematical
model. The calculation of the top Lyapunov exponent enables us to decide
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whether a stochastic system is stable or not. Using a program in Maple 12,
we display the Lyapunov exponent and the system orbits.
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